about what ought to be done, which would include any considerations that might be deemed "reasons of conscience." 5 The law says, "Do not carry a weapon into school," it does not say,
"Do not carry a weapon into school, unless you have a really important reason for doing so,"
such as a demand of conscience. Obviously the law may include explicit exceptions to the prohibition in question--for example, for law enforcement officers--but concrete exceptions to a general rule are very different from a generic "opt out" clause that "constitutionalizing" civil disobedience would provide. The problem with the proposed broad "exception for conscience,"
given the Razian account of authority, is that it would no longer be intelligible what the law requires, since every legal command would be of the form, "Do X, unless you have a conscientious [or very weighty] reason not to." Rather than the law being what Raz calls an "exclusionary" (or preempting) reason for acting one way rather than another, it would become merely an invitation to deliberate about what ought to be done. The law"s claim of authority is often not justified, to be sure, but that is not the issue here. The issue, rather, is that it is central to the very idea of a legal system that it claims authority, and to claim authority is to claim the right to say what ought to be done, not to invite a dialogue with every individual"s conscience about what ought to be done. A constitutional right to civil disobedience is tantamount to a denial of the law"s claim to authority, that is, to its very claim to be law. It would not only invite anarchy, it would be an effective admission that there is no law, that the rule of individual conscience is the status quo.
Notice that the existing regime of exemptions for claims of religious conscience in most
Western democracies does not pose a similar problem because religious reasons for not complying with a law are only a subset of all the reasons that might bear on what we ought to do, the latter being the reasons that the law tries to preempt in claiming the authority to tell us what we ought to do. A law that says, "You must do X, unless you have a religious reason of conscience not to" is still quite intelligible, except perhaps in the odd case where the law rests only on religious reasons. Yet even in that latter case, it will still be intelligible what must be done assuming the law includes (legislatively or through judicial decision) a specification of what counts as "religious" reasons of conscience (much as the law against carrying a weapon in school is not rendered unintelligible because there is an exception for law enforcement officers, a category that is otherwise defined 6 ). By contrast, in a scheme of universal exemptions for "reasons of conscience" (however weighty we imagine they must be), every law is literally meaningless, since every reason for acting the law might preempt is, in fact, available as a ground for acting otherwise to a person of "conscience." It is possible, of course, that a particular legal system might define the scope of reasons of conscience in such a way that a system of putatively universal exemptions for conscience became more like a regime of exemptions for matters of religious conscience. But in that scenario, there is not, really, a general exemption for claims of conscience, but only for some subset of those claims that the law chooses to recognize.
The preceding may be jurisprudentially interesting points about the nature of law, but there is a far more mundane, practical reason why no legal system is going to embrace a "constitutional right to civil disobedience" in the form of a general liberty of conscience, whatever its pedigree or character. Claims of conscience present hard evidential issues for 6 Something similar can be said about the exception to the rule against the use of deadly force in cases of self-defense. Notice, first, that self-defense is only justified against illegal use of force, whereas those claiming an exemption for reasons of conscience are claiming that against lawful action. Second, the self-defense exception is also defined in most jurisdictions, and not simply a matter "up for grabs" in reasoning about what ought to be done: it is more like the exception for "law enforcement officers" with respect to carrying weapons in school than it is like a generic exemption from every law if there is a reason of conscience. courts, and their correct resolution is important since what is at stake is the very ability of the community to enforce its laws of general applicability. From the epistemic standpoint, the great virtue of claims of religious conscience is that they typically provide evidential proxies for conscience that are much easier for courts to assess. A claim of conscience is, after all, a claim about what one must do, no matter what--not as a matter of crass self-interest, but because it is a kind of moral imperative central to one"s integrity as a person, to the meaning of one"s life. But how are courts to determine whether someone"s claim to defy the law is really a claim of conscience? That is the specter that haunts any legal regime governing liberty of conscience, and the great practical advantage of a regime which privileges liberty of religious conscience is that it gives courts a more robust evidential base for their determinations. After all, a litigant who asserts a claim of religious conscience must reference a religion. Religions typically have texts and doctrines and commands, either written or passed down orally among many adherents.
Membership in the religion in question usually depends (as Durkheim"s account of religion correctly noticed 7 ) on participation in practices and rituals and ceremonies. All of this gives the courts a rich evidential base for assessing the genuineness of a claim of conscience. Rather than trying to peer into the depths of a man"s soul, the court can simply weigh oral and textual evidence about the religion"s doctrines and its requirements, as well as the evidence that the claimant in question really was a member of the religion, as reflected in his participation in the relevant practice and rituals. 7 See the discussion in Chapter 2, supra pp. __-__. 8 It is true that in the United States, the Supreme Court has held that, "The guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect," Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) , and has affirmed that the "sincerity" of the belief is ultimately decisive. Yet even Thomas involved someone who was clearly a Jehovah"s Witness, though one whose faith happened to demand of him actions that other Jehovah"s Witnesses did not view as mandatory. Of course, we saw something similar in the Canadian case of Multani: not all Sikhs thought it was essential to carry a real knife, yet the Canadian Supreme Court upheld the exemption for those Sikhs who thought the actual knife essential to religious observance. In these, and similar cases, the courts still rely on evidence of an organized religion, and its exemptions from generally applicable laws to all claims of conscience, no matter how individual (or idiosyncratic). Recognizing the epistemic problem-that courts must adjudicate whether a claim of conscience is really a claim of conscience-perhaps we should simply extend legal protection for liberty of conscience only to claims of conscience that are rooted in communal or group traditions and practices that mimic, from an evidential point of view, those of religious groups?
9 Think of the vigorous and vocal groups now common in affluent capitalist societies that promote veganism or animal rights. Many vegans, for example, regard the appropriation and consumption (as food or otherwise) of non-human animals as morally odious, akin to the chattel slavery of humans. 10 Organized as these individuals are into ideological and advocacy (and even sometimes revolutionary 11 ) groups, it is easy enough to find many of the same kinds of evidentiary markers of a genuine claim of conscience as in the case of a religious claimant. So why not give the vegan prisoner, with bona fide involvements in the animal liberation "movement," legal standing to claim exemption from dietary and/or prison work regimens that would violate his conscientious objection to the exploitation of non-human animals?
requirements (even if not universal), in assessing the validity of the claims. We see something similar at work in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989) , notwithstanding the surface rhetoric of the opinion affirming that a claimant need not attach his claim of conscience to any particular religious sect and its doctrines. Yet Mr. Frazee did affirm that he was a "Christian" and he sought exemption in connection with his observance of the familiar Christian Sabbath, Sunday. On both fronts then, his claim was easily recognizable as a religious one in a Christian-majority society like the United States. 9 Other epistemic devices are, of course, also possible, to try to better calibrate exemptions with those who have genuine claims of conscience. Laws, for example, might impose different burdens on those seeking exemptions, as a way of identifying those with a genuine claim of conscience (e.g., someone seeking an exemption from one year of military service might have to undertake, instead, two years of alternative civil service). It seems unlikely, of course, that any alternative measures are going to resolve the epistemic problem, and they will still be vulnerable to the Rousseauian worry discussed, below.
10 See, e.g., Gary L. Francione, Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, 48 Rutgers L Rev 397 (1996) .
Notice, of course, that there is no principled reason for expanding exemptions this way;
the proposal is motivated entirely by the practical and epistemic worries noted above. This approach would have the virtue of not treating only claims of religious conscience as legally special, when there is no good moral reason to do so. But it would also have the unwelcome consequence of treating genuine claims of conscience unequally before the law, simply based on how practicable it is for courts to adjudicate their genuineness, and nothing else. Organized vegans would have legal standing, but not Henry Thoreau or his 21 st -century analogue.
Is the unfairness of such inequality justifiable? Should we not simply concede that the success of any claim at law depends on the ability to prove one"s entitlement, and leave it at that? 12 Some accused are wrongfully convicted of crimes, but that does not mean that the right of criminal defendants to prove their innocence constitutes an injustice. If everyone at least has a right to establish a claim of conscience demanding an exemption, why should it matter, morally, that not everyone can prove the genuineness of his or her claim equally well (or equally easily)?
We may put the challenge even more starkly. Those innocent of a crime with which they are charged are entitled to be acquitted, and it is an injustice if they are convicted instead. But that injustice does not entail that it is unjust (because unequal) to establish a system of criminal justice administration in which defendants must try to prove their innocence. Those with a genuine claim of conscience are also entitled (in a legal regime with universal exemptions for claims of conscience) to an exemption; it is an injustice if they are denied the exemption, but that does not mean the system of universal exemptions is morally objectionable. Is there any pertinent difference between the two cases?
12 I am grateful to David Strauss for pressing a version of this objection.
The difference turns, I suspect, on matters of degree regarding the ease, or difficulty, of proof. If it were extremely difficult for most of those charged with certain kinds of crimes to prove their innocence, such that many innocent defendants were regularly convicted despite their lack of culpability, then a complaint about unequal treatment seems to me to have moral force.
The objection then would be that the standards of proof had been calibrated in such a way to entail unequal treatment of too many defendants similarly situated in terms of culpability. This will entail a judgment about matters of degree, to repeat, and it is possible that a scheme of universal exemptions for claims of conscience, with suitable evidential standards, might do well enough to blunt the inequality objection. In that event, the inequality of treatment of claims of conscience is not necessarily fatal to a scheme of universal exemptions for claims of conscience.
It bears noticing, however, that a fourth difficulty with such a scheme of exemptions looms, one that is quite independent of the question of proof. Let us call this, for ease of reference, the "Rousseauian" worry about exemptions. If general compliance with laws is necessary to promote the "general welfare" or the "common good," then selective exemptions from those laws is a morally objectionable injury to the general welfare.
To be sure, not every law from which exemptions might be sought will impede the lawful pursuit of the general welfare, but most will--whether it is exemptions from zoning regulations for 17 This will be true even in non-democratic societies, since the costs to an authoritarian society of controlling the population will prove overwhelming it if deviates to widely from accepted conscientious norms in the population. 18 Notice too that adopting a strong anti-establishment principle, along the lines of French laïcité, would not obviate the problem, which results not simply from government efforts to promote particular religions, but from the way in which the other regulatory actions of government will be insensitive to infringements upon matters of minority conscience, religious or otherwise. But perhaps such burdens are the price of not treating religious conscience as special, when no principled argument could support that practice? We return to the special problems posed by laïcité, below. The Internal Revenue Code states that "[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes . . . and which does not participate in . . . any political compaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office" is exempt from Federal income taxes.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
prejudice likely to co-opt principled arguments for unprincipled ends, a concern which seems particularly acute in the domain of religious liberty? That fact might be thought to lend support to the Eisgruber and Sager argument discussed earlier (supra n. __). But the question there was whether vulnerability to discrimination was adequate to mark out religion as deserving special legal protection, and the answer to that question is unaffected by the fact that religion, like so many other kinds of human beliefs and practices, may be susceptible to discrimination: what matters for the point in the text is that religion is vulnerable to discrimination, not that it is especially or uniquely so vulnerable. notice-and this might seem, at first blush, the important point here--that such an assault would be effectively defeated by a legal regime that recognized religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.
Of course, it is precisely the point of the French conception of laïcité to reject such exemptions, in favor of an ideal of equal citizenry of persons qua persons. But more importantly, the real objection here is not to the absence of exemptions for claims of religious conscience from generally applicable laws, but rather to the fact that the law in question seems a mere subterfuge for a morally impermissible motive or purpose, namely, the motive or purpose of not tolerating a particular religion, namely, Islam. If there are good moral arguments for liberty of conscience-precisely the view defended in Chapter 1-then those arguments must surely rule out the persecution of particular claims of religious conscience, not because they are religious, but because they are claims of conscience. The only question about the French law banning head scarves then is whether it is animated by intolerance towards Islam, not whether it reflects the drawbacks of a system that lacks exemptions for claims of religious conscience.
Can we dismiss the preceding concerns quite so easily? The argument for liberty of conscience, to repeat, demands toleration of claims of conscience, but the No Exemptions approach says that the law need not carve out exemptions from generally applicable laws for claims of conscience. The worry, then, is that the requirement of toleration will amount to little in practice. Could not the state simply burden any disfavored claim of conscience under the guise of pursuing a general objective? In the case of French laïcité, the problem is even worse than that, since the general objective in question is one that is not neutral about religion, but specifically deems religious attributes ones that do not belong in the public sphere. Is not exclusion from the public sphere in this manner itself a pernicious burden?
It is important to keep the two issues separate. One worry (the focus so far) is that a No Exemptions approach makes it too easy for states to burden conscience under the guise of pursuing neutral objectives. The second (and new) worry is that the objective of excluding religion from the public sphere (in the manner of French laïcité) is, itself, inherently intolerant, and so impermissible.
The first worry raises only an epistemic or evidential issue. After all, it has been the baseline premise of the argument of this book that of course state action whose aim is to burden particular religious claims of conscience is inconsistent with the moral requirement of toleration! Any prohibition, in any area of law, on particular state purposes will raise evidential questions about how to identify cases where the forbidden purpose is really at work. On its face, it seems odd to think that the correct response to an evidential problem is an exemption from the law that is not otherwise morally justified. To be sure, if we thought the evidential problem were insurmountable-that is, if we had reason to think that it will be impossibly difficult to discriminate between the façade of neutral purpose and actual neutral purpose in legislation that burdens religion-then we might think exemptions for religious claims of conscience the preferable approach, notwithstanding the inequality such an approach entails and notwithstanding the burden on the general welfare. But notice that this style of argument could equally well propel us back to general exemptions for claims of conscience, to the extent we thought the façade of neutral purpose could regularly cover over the attempt to persecute nonreligious claims of conscience as well.
What, then, of the second worry? Is French laïcité in its very nature impermissibly intolerant by excluding religion from the public sphere? Does not the legal judgment that, in the public square, the equality of persons qua persons demands that they shed the visible indicia of their religious identities constitute intolerance of religion inconsistent with the arguments of Chapter 1? The immediate answer might seem to "no," since the Rawlsian and Millian arguments of Chapter 1 only established that there is a good moral case for liberty of conscience, not that such liberty could only be realized in the public arena. It is one thing for the state to criminalize a particular religion and its practice, quite another for the state to say that the religion and its practices do not belong in the public schools. Let us shift our focus, for a moment, from religion to political speech. The French, like many European countries, impose legal restrictions on public (and even private) advocacy of and displays of Nazism.
24 Wearing Nazi regalia in the public schools, or anywhere in public, would quite clearly incur legal sanction in most of the countries that survived the horrors of the Nazi era. These laws are quite clearly "intolerant" of Nazism, and, equally clearly, they infringe on matters of conscience, albeit matters of depraved conscience. example, the vast majority of the population reports that they would never vote for an atheist for elective office, but express much higher levels of tolerance for (i.e., willingness to support for elective office) gay men and women, Moslems, and Jews. 31 Yet even in the U.S., this antipathy towards atheism does not manifest itself (at least not yet) in the burnings of heretics or the legal persecution of non-believers. Yet lesser, but still real, harms are apparent from the hyperreligiosity of the United States, such as the assault on science curricula in the public schools.
(As we will argue below, the state can, quite consistently with principled toleration, disestablish religion from the public schools.) 30 It is possible, to be sure, that French laïcité makes no moral sense, and that it should either encompass a general ban on religious expression, comparable to the ban on Nazi expression, or it should be relaxed so as to accommodate religious expression in the public spheres. The former seems to me an approach of dubious merit on Millian grounds, since even if we assume that many religious beliefs are false, not all of the beliefs associated with religion are, and even the false ones may still have the salutary effect of forcing those who reject them to clarify their reasons for doing so. See the discussion, supra Chapter __, pp. __-__. 31 Penny Edgell, Joseph Gerteis, and Douglas Hartmann, Atheists As "Other": Moral Boundaries and Cultural Membership in American Society, 71 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 211, 215 (2006) (Noting that "the gap in willingness to vote for atheists versus other religious minorities . . . is large and persistent," and that in surveys fewer than half of respondents expressed willingness to vote for an open atheist). one doubts that those in thrall to Nazi claims of conscience will act, to the extent they can, in ways that really harm human beings. The harm at issue in the case of religious invasion of the public sphere is far different: not ordinarily to physical well-being, but, in the first instance, to a moral ideal of equal citizenship. The denial, de facto if not de jure, of full equal citizenship might lead to more tangible blood-and-flesh harms, but the prediction that it will do so is considerably more speculative, and not obviously adequate to support a Harm Principle argument in the spirit of Mill (even allowing for the ambiguities of what constitutes "harm" in a Millian framework). The only Risk of Harm to which the French approach can reliably advert is the risk of increased false belief, but that, as we have already seen in Chapter 4, is not obviously a harm, since false beliefs often have salutary effects (they are, as Nietzsche says, sometimes conditions of life itself), both for their adherents and sometimes for others.
The conclusion, then, seems clear: French laïcité is, in fact, a case of impermissible intolerance of religion, unless one were to assume, contrary to reality, that most religions burdened by it were akin to Nazism. But that also means that the No Exemptions approach to principled toleration is incompatible with a regime like that of French laïcité. In fact, this should not be a surprising conclusion, since the central contention of the No Exemptions approach is that there do not need to be exemptions for claims of conscience from laws with neutral objectives. The "neutrality" of objectives required, it now seems, requires neutrality as to dictates of conscience that do not violate the Harm Principle. 32 Since it can not be maintained 32 In the next section, we shall return to an important qualification of this claim. It is one thing to be neutral with respect to the objective of suppressing or burdening a particular claim of conscience (unless doing so would be justified on Harm Principle grounds), it is quite another to be neutral about what ought to be done, where what ought to be done may reflect what I will call a "Vision of Conscience." The state can not be neutral as to the latter, except if it stops being a state. 
Religious Toleration and Religious Establishment
Our primary focus so far has been on the interaction between the requirements of a principle of toleration and exemptions from generally applicable laws that infringe on claims of conscience-what, in the United States, would be known as "free exercise" issues. But any conception of religious liberty must also address issues of religious establishment, that is, issues about the state endorsement of a particular religion, or of religion as against non-religion, or even of non-religion as against religion. How does religious establishment interact with religious liberty and with the moral requirements imposed by a principle of toleration?
We have already broached this issue, in part, through the preceding discussion of French laïcité. French laïcité represents a particular kind of disestablishment of religion, excluding, as it does, religious expression and symbols from much of the public sphere--an exclusion that, as we argued above, can not be justified on Harm Principle grounds, and thus seems to constitute a burden on conscience inconsistent with principled toleration. But it does not follow from this that disestablishment of religion in favor of non-religion is inconsistent with principled toleration. After all, liberal states necessarily disestablish all illiberal claims of conscience by putting the imprimatur of the state on equality, on democracy, on liberty, and so on-though they do not go the intolerant step further of forbidding all expression in the public sphere of illiberal ideas, except when those ideas are likely (perhaps imminently likely) to result in actions that violate the Harm Principle.
But most liberal states go a step beyond that, also putting the imprimatur of the state, for example, on science as a reliable source of knowledge about the natural world, as reflected in the curricula of the public schools, or by using public monies to fund medical research and procedures to which some taxpayers object "as a matter of conscience." 33 I shall argue that, consistent with a principle of toleration, the state may indeed puts its imprimatur on values and world-views that are inconsistent with the claims of conscience of some of its citizens (as long as its objective in doing so is not to suppress or coercively burden those claims of conscience but to achieve some conception of the good-a point to which we shall return). The state, consistent with the principle of toleration, may even disestablish religion, though not in the manner of 33 The United States is, to be sure, somewhat unusual among the developed Western democracies in sometimes restricting access to public money for well-established medical procedures and research because it offends sectarian religious claims of conscience. See, e.g., Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, H.R. Res. 1105, 111th Cong. § 507 (2009) (prohibiting federal funding for any abortion or health benefits coverage that includes coverage of abortion); Balanced Budget Downpayment Act of 1996, H.R. Res. 2880 , 104th Cong. § 128 (1996 (banning federal funding for "research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than that allowed for research on fetuses in utero . . problem with French laïcité is that it wants to establish a particular Vision of Conscience-of persons as equal qua persons, without regard to religion or ethnicity-through coercion of those with minority claims of religious conscience, and in a way that can not be justified on Harm Principle grounds. Religious symbols worn by students in the public schools simply do not undermine democratic equality, except on fantastically paranoid assumptions about human 34 See the discussion supra pp. __-__. 35 It is important to bear in mind that when governments endorse a vision of what is "true" and "real," they are almost always doing so because of practical considerations, i.e., because they believe (correctly, in this instance) that a scientific view of the world is practically useful, and so students should learn scientific truths in school, not religious ones. We return to the issue infra n. __. psychology and sociology, and that is true even if the French state might be quite justified, consistent with a principle of toleration, in, for example, suppressing the hate speech of an Imam who claimed that all non-Muslims were infidels who should be murdered. 36 Without a doubt, it would be consistent with principled toleration for the French government to teach secularism in the public schools, to affirm the secular character of the Republic in its public pronouncements, and to allocate its resources in a way consistent with these objectives. What it can not do, There will remain, to be sure, fuzzy boundary cases involved in the idea that the state may endorse a Vision of Conscience but not suppress the expression of contrary visions. Some state endorsements may crowd out private expressions of contrary visions, for example, a worry that may be especially serious where the media of communication are under state control. (On the other hand, Britain is, again, a counter-example to this concern.) But even allowing for hard cases, it seems clear that, in principle, there is no incompatibility between state endorsement of a Vision of Conscience-religious or irreligious-and the demands of principled toleration.
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Principled toleration requires the state not to persecute or target for special burdens particular 37 A state might, of course, endorse a Vision of Conscience that demands more than principled toleration. Consider what Nussbaum calls "the Madisonian ideal" of "equal respect" (Liberty of Conscience, pp. __-__), which prohibits branding, symbolically or otherwise, certain citizens as "outsiders." Such a Vision could, conceivably, demand exemptions from generally applicable laws as the price of sustaining a kind of equality in public life. I think it is doubtful, though, whether any state could really embrace as stringent an "equal respect" criterion as Nussbaum contemplates, as suggested by some of the astonishing accommodations her view imagines: e.g., children being able to opt out of a proper physics or biology class because as "a matter of conscience" they believe God created the universe and human beings, in a way consistent with the "Big Bang" and the theory of evolution by natural selection. [add cites and discussion of MN"s view on this here].
claims of conscience; it does not require the state to cease being a state, i.e., to cease promoting a Vision of Conscience, of the public good, social welfare, or human fulfillment.
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American constitutional law has recently confronted a version of this problem in the context of the "viewpoint discrimination" revolution in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The U.S. Supreme Court had, for some time, interpreted the constitutional prohibition on an "establishment" of religion as forbidding laws requiring "excessive entanglement" with religion. 39 The meaning of that prohibition was also for a generation or so moderately clear: it meant that state-supported schools could not, for example, let their facilities be utilized by sectarian religious groups promoting a sectarian, religious message. This was a kind of disestablishment: it said that state schools were off-limits to those who would promote religion.
This disestablishment co-existed, of course, with secure protections for both religious expression in private life and the advocacy of religious claims in other public spaces, such as the media and the proverbial "public square."
In the 1980s, conservative religious groups began litigating against such prohibitions, arguing that they were unconstitutional "viewpoint discrimination" by the state: if state schools open their after-school facilities or otherwise offer support to various viewpoints (e.g., the animal rights group, or the College Republicans, or the local chapter of the Socialist Workers Party), then it is an unconstitutional violation of freedom of speech to prohibit religious groups from 38 I am here aligning my view with that of the so-called "perfectionists" in political theory, like Joseph Raz and Steven Wall. Rawlsian political liberals think a state can actually abstain from promoting a Vision of Conscience that isn"t generally accepted, though it seems to me that they just denominate as "unreasonable" anyone who has a Vision of Conscience incompatible with the Rawlsian vision.
39 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971) . Lemon has, of course, been eviscerated in some measure by subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, but the "viewpoint discrimination" revolution discussed below, in the text, did, in my view, the most damage to the principle. But what precisely is the difference between saying, "You may not use public school facilities to teach a particular religious dogma" and saying, "You may not appear in a public school wearing clothing that reflects your religious beliefs"? After all, French laïcité targets the latter, as well as the former, but now it appears we are claiming there is a morally pertinent difference between the cases. And, indeed, there is, though, as in all these cases, some of the differences are ones of degree, rather than kind. The argument so far has been that the state must, of course, express a Vision of Conscience, and that it can do so consistent with principled toleration as long as its aim is not to suppress or coercively burden individual claims of conscience. But why does it constitute an impermissible burden on my religious Vision of Conscience to forbid me from wearing a Jewish skull-cap in the public school, but it does not constitute an impermissible burden on my religious Vision of Conscience to forbid me from teaching the truths of the Torah in the public schools?
If states can-indeed, must-promote Visions of Conscience, then states must be able to manifest their endorsement of the Vision. One way in which all states do so is through their 40 For representative cases, see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993) ; Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995 . educational systems, and through what can and can not be taught to the students in the system. Suppose a particular sect believed that the sun revolves around the earth, and that it would offend the dignity of God, who made man in his image, to claim otherwise. If the state turns its science classrooms over to the teaching of this view-even as one view among many that students might consider-it would, on any reasonable, interpretation undermine its endorsement of the Copernican vision of the solar system. Words matter, and words spoken by agents of the state matter, at least insofar as they communicate, quite clearly, the Vision of the Conscience the state endorses.
But suppose our anti-Copernican sect issued a distinctive shirt to its adherents, say, one with a picture of the solar system with the earth in the center. If the state permits students in the public schools to wear that shirt, would anyone reasonably infer that the state endorse the antiCopernican vision of the world? It is hard to see how that conclusion would be warranted, when the school as a whole-its curriculum, its books, and its facilities-are given over to teaching the Copernican conception.
This argument depends, of course, on background assumptions about the significance of different forms of expression, verbal and sartorial. One could imagine local cultural norms sufficiently different from ours such that if the public schools permitted someone to appear wearing a Jewish skull-cap, it was tantamount to the state endorsing Judaism. But at least in the Western democracies, that does not appear to be the status quo with respect to our background norms. Conversely, one could imagine a society in which cultural norms view the public schools not as the agents of state endorsement, but as akin to public parks, and so the fact that afterschool facilities were turned over to the anti-Copernicans would not in any way be inconsistent with the state"s endorsement of the Copernican vision. Any plausible conception of which regulations impermissibly coerce or burden claims of conscience must be similarly attuned to local cultural norms.
It may be worth pausing to consider the contrary scenario to the American one prior to the "viewpoint discrimination" revolution-that is, a scenario in which the state, instead of disestablishing religion in the public schools, rather endorses a particular religion, say, Catholicism, and thus declines to let funding for public education be utilized for supporting Hinduism or atheism. Thus, in this alternative scenario, public school facilities would be available to the Catholic Student Society, but not to the Hindus or the atheists or perhaps even to the Republicans! 41 Can a state promote a Catholic Vision of Conscience this way consistent with the demands of principled toleration?
Let us assume that the background cultural norms are the same, in the sense that public schools which permit students to wear sectarian clothing of any kind are not understood to endorse that sect, and in which the content of the public school curriculum, by contrast, is generally understood to reflect the state"s endorsement of a Vision of Conscience. And let us suppose that our counterfactual society permits the public expression of Hinduism, atheism, Calvinism; indeed, permits parents to send their children to appropriate sectarian schools in lieu of the public schools; indeed, in the manner of Britain, funds these "alternative" schools. It is hard to see how such a society could be deemed to run afoul of the requirements of principled toleration.
42 41 We will suppose these are Jesuits who are "establishing" Catholicism. 42 There might seem to be a problem in the case of the establishment of particular religions, like and 1960s among former Jews. I think the explanation is obvious: the whole cultural context of these ludicrous Bible-reading rituals was guaranteed to undermine their impact. And, of course, it was not just the public schools, but the public culture of the nation as a whole that was in-yourface Protestant. And yet it all had no impact on the liberty of conscience of a youngster in New York City, where it was easier to find Trotskyites to discuss ideas with than it was to find Baptists.
but also how they ought to act, and, in particular, how they ought to act in matters far removed from anything that might otherwise be a subject of the public school curriculum. today, as then, there will be communities in which the effect of such a practice would be to encourage irreligion and ridicule of religion. So while establishment of religion or irreligion can both be compatible with principled toleration, assessing whether it is so will require case-by-case judgments in light of the prevailing cultural norms of the communities affected.
It is very important to emphasize at this stage in the argument that whether we should prefer a state that establishes Catholicism or Hinduism rather than atheism is a wholly separate moral question. The argument so far has only been that such establishments can be compatible with principled toleration. One might think that establishment of a Vision of Conscience, religious or irreligious, ought to turn on whether that Vision is a proper object of Appraisal
Respect. As we learned in Chapter 4, however, religion per se is not a likely candidate for Appraisal Respect, which might be a fatal obstacle to defending any kind of religious establishment even if such establishment were compatible with principled toleration. 44 We have not, to be sure, made the argument that irreligion, in the form of atheism or otherwise, is in fact a proper object of Appraisal Respect, and so nothing in the preceding argument should be taken to 44 Perhaps, though, particular religions are candidates for Appraisal Respect. Nothing in the argument of Chapter 4 rules out that possibility. So far, we have pressed the proposition that the No Exemptions approach to claims of conscience, religious or otherwise, is the one most consistent with fairness (given the practicalities of enforcement), with the very concept of law, and with the necessity for states to endorse a Vision of Conscience. But a final worry no doubt looms: for are not religious claims of conscience especially resilient and fierce, especially likely to provoke backlash, disobedience, and the proverbial "blood in the streets"? After all, if your sense of categorical obligation-the hallmark of a claim of conscience-is also conjoined with concern for the well-being of your soul not just now, or tomorrow, but for all eternity, then you will not accept interference with your obligations lightly. In short, perhaps the real reason to think that principled toleration of religious claims of conscience deserve special consideration is because they are the ones least likely to accede to a No Exemptions regime?
A suitable response to this worry must start by remembering that it is not the case that the "eternal well-being of the soul" is a distinctive aspect of religious categorical commands-some religious sects emphasize that, some do not. So the worry that categorical commands will, necessarily, be taken more seriously by the religious than the non-religious can not be right.
Indeed, the whole idea that categorical demands are taken more seriously by the religious than the non-religious is one we rejected, effectively, in Chapter 2. Recall that if one looks at horrifically oppressive political environments, like Nazi Germany in the 1930s--environments that would seem well-positioned as "natural experiments" for weeding out real claim of conscience (ones experienced as categorical) from the pretenders, that is, those who relinquish their "obligations" in the face of drastic consequences-what one finds is that religious believers are among those who "risk everything" to do what is right, but so too are many non-religious believers, such as communists. That certain human beings are capable of experiencing certain demands as categorical is an important psychological fact about creatures like us, to which law must be sensitive. That psychological fact, however, does not track religious belief.
So the initial worry should really be different: not that religious believers will respond to a No Exemptions approach with "blood in the streets," but rather that in any society, there will be some conscientious individuals who will not comply with generally applicable laws that offend their conscience. That is surely right, but it constitutes no argument against the No Exemptions approach. We can as little justify exemptions from generally applicable laws to "those most likely to make trouble" as we can justify exemptions from those laws to "those who have religious claims of conscience." Sometimes those with claims of religions conscience may be quite correct to resist the law, but that is wholly independent of the question whether the law ought to exempt them from its application. It has been the argument of this book that principled toleration does not require that we do so. Toleration may be a virtue, both in individuals and in states, but its selective application to the conscience of only religious believers is not morally defensible.
